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Abstract
This essay is about the North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”), the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”), and the World Trade Organization (“WTO”). The
United States has chosen to participate in NAFTA, GATT, and WTO by the President’s signing
international agreements. These agreements, however, have not been presented to the Senate for
ratification as treaties, although, as some commentators have noted, they bear the characteristics
of treaties. Rather, they are implemented by Congress enacting domestic implementing legislation
as statutory law.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States has committed to participate in the
globalization of world trade by entering into international agree-
ments and participating in international organizations. These
commitments raise important issues regarding the interaction of
domestic international trade law, Chevron' deference principles,
the Charming Betsy2 doctrine, and decisions of the World Trade
Organization ("WTO") in the area of unfair trade practices.
The United States has chosen to participate in the North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"), 3 the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), and the World
Trade Organization ("WTO") 4 by the President's signing inter-
national agreements. These agreements, however, have not
been presented to the Senate for ratification as treaties, al-
though, as some commentators have noted, they bear the char-
acteristics of treaties.5 Rather, they are implemented by Con-
gress enacting domestic implementing legislation as statutory
* Judge, United States Court of International Trade.
** Professor of Political Science, Lehman College of The City University of New
York.
1. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. Alexander Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804)
[hereinafter Charming Betsy].
3. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., H.R.
Doc. 103-159, at 713 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA].
4. Uruguay Round Trade Agreement, H.R. Doc. 103-316, at Vol. 9, 1696 (1994).
5. See generally JOHn H. JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RE-
tATIONS 257 (1977). In the trade agreements area, Congress has generally
preauthorized negotiation of the agreements. Id. Compare Bruce Ackerman & David
Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995) (defending the constitu-
tionality of the Congressional-Executive agreement), with Laurence H. Tribe, Taking
Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation,
108 HARv. L. REV. 1221 (1995) (challenging the use of the Congressional-Executive
agreement in lieu of a trade treaty). Cf Made In The USA Found. v. United States, 242
F.3d 1300 (l1th Cir. 2001) (holding that issue of whether non-treaty status of NAFTA
renders it unconstitutional is a nonjusticiable political question).
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law.6
I. INTERNATIONAL TRADE A GREEMENTS IN
US. DOMESTIC LAW
The Constitutional basis for the domestic implementing leg-
islation is found in the Article I power of Congress to regulate
international commerce. 7 The domestic implementing legisla-
tion delegates to the Secretary of Commerce,8 the head of an
executive branch agency, and the International Trade Commis-
sion ("ITC"), an independent regulatory agency, the responsibil-
ity for administering the unfair trade practices aspect of the leg-
islation.9 By entering into the agreements, however, the United
States has committed to international dispute resolution mecha-
nisms that operate entirely outside the United States legal sys-
tem.' Resolution of binational or multinational trade disputes
may be sought through the WTO dispute-resolution mecha-
nisms, as well as through private action before the ITC and
ITA.1 "Unfair trade" decisions of the ITC and ITA may be ap-
pealed to the United States Court of International Trade
("CIT"), an Article III court, subsequently to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and ultimately, by writ
of certiorari, to the United States Supreme Court. 1 2 A national
of any party to the NAFTA accord, however, may opt to resolve
the dispute through the binational panel procedure of that
agreement.' Given that the U.S. Government and organs of the
6. See North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L. No.
103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993); Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465,
108 Stat. 4809 (1994).
7. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations . . .").
8. The Commerce Department arm responsible for administering the implement-
ing legislation is the International Trade Administration ("ITA").
9. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1673, 1677 (1994).
10. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Dis-
putes, Art. 17.6, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 2, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay
Round vol. 27, H.R. Doc. 103-316, at 1654 (1994); 19 U.S.C. § 3533 (1994) (providing
for participation in and response to WTO dispute resolution).
11. 19 U.S.C. § 1671 (1994).
12. 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1993); 28 U.S.C. § 1 254(g)
(1948); 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5) (1999).
13. See North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8, 1993, § 1904; 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(g) (1994). Although a few commentators have questioned whether the depri-
vation of an Article III forum is constitutional, a challenge to the constitutionality of
NAFTA's dispute resolution procedure failed on standing grounds. Am. Coalition for
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international trade organizations may have different views as to
the meaning of applicable laws and the underlying international
agreements, conflicts may arise.14 Inherently, international bod-
ies are not bound by the views of U.S. agencies or courts, and
U.S. statutory provisions do not mandate a U.S. agency or court
to follow international body decisions.
1 5
II. U.S. CASE LAW THE LIMITS OF CHEVRON DEFERENCE
Until recently, it had been settled jurisprudence since the
U.S. Supreme Court's unanimous decision 6 in the Chevron case
that executive agency interpretations of international trade law
are entitled to deference.17 Chevron, which involved a challenge
to an Environmental Protection Agency regulation, set forth a
two-step rule for judicial review of a Federal agency's interpreta-
tion of a statute it administers:
First, always, is the question whether Congress has spoken di-
rectly to the precise question at issue .... If a court, employ-
ing traditional rules of statutory construction, ascertains that
Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue,
that intention is the law and must be given effect. [Second, if]
Competitive Trade v. Clinton, 128 F.3d 761 (D.C. Cir. 1997). See Demetrios G. Metrop-
oulos, Constitutional Dimensions of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 27 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 141 (1994). See also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), which
upheld Executive Orders of the President, unsupported by express Congressional ac-
tion, relegating private parties with claims against Iran, including claims already filed in
Article III courts, to a U.S.-Iran claims tribunal. The Court concluded that several ex-
isting statutes, although not directly applicable to the case, supported the belief that
Congress had accepted "a broad scope for executive action in circumstances such as
those presented in this case." Id. at 677.
14. See Hyundai Elecs. Co., Ltd. v. United States, 53 F. Supp. 2d 1334 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1999); Earth Island Inst. v. Daley, 48 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1076 n.19 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1999) (outside the unfair trade practices area, U.S. implementation of environmental
statute found GATT violative by WTO appellate body). See also Paul Magnusson, The
New Trade Rep Won't Get Much Sleep, Bus. WK., Jan. 29, 2001, at 38 (describing some of
the conflicts that the newly appointed U.S. Trade Representative will have to address).
15. As to NAFIA panel decisions, Congress has spoken directly and indicated that
the U.S. courts may consider NAFTA decisions although they are not binding. 19
U.S.C. § 1516a(g) (3) (1994). See infra note 51 and accompanying text with regard to
limited WTO deference to national interpretations. 19 U.S.C. § 3512(a) (1) (1994) pro-
vides that the Uruguay Round Agreements do not prevail over "any law of the United
States."
16. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Justices Rehnquist, Marshall, and O'Connor did not take part in the decision.
17. See, e.g., Suramerica de Aleaciones Laminadas, C.A., v. United States, 966 F.2d
660, 665 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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the court determines that Congress has not directly addressed
the precise question at issue ... if the statute is silent or am-
biguous with respect to the specific question at issue [then
the issue before the court is] whether the agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute, [that is
whether the agency's interpretation is reasonable or rational
and consistent with the statute]. 18
The Court explained the rationale for the decision as follows:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either
political branch of the Government. Courts must, in some
cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the
basis of the judge's personal policy preferences. In contrast,
an agency to which Congress has delegated policy-making re-
sponsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, prop-
erly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise
policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not di-
rectly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and
it is entirely appropriate for the political branch of the Gov-
ernment to make such policy choices-resolving the compet-
ing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did
not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency
charged with the administration of the statute in light of eve-
ryday realities. 9
Chevron deference in the international trade area has not
been restricted to agency interpretations reduced to regulatory
language but has been expanded generally to all aspects of the
agency's decision making in unfair trade proceedings.2" The
continuing viability of the latter instance of deference, however,
is no longer entirely clear in the wake of the U.S. Supreme
Court's recent decisions in Christensen v. Harris County2 and
United States v. Mead Corporation.22
18. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-843.
19. Id. at 865-866 (internal citations omitted).
20. See, e.g., Daewoo Elecs. Co. v. Int'l Union of Electronic Elec., Technical, Sala-
ried, and Mach. Workers, 6 F.3d 1511, 1515-16 (Fed. Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S.
1204 (1994). Further, maximal deference based on foreign policy implications has
been cited. Smith-Corona Group v. United States, 713 F.2d 1568, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1022 (1984). The difficulty with the reference to foreign policy in
this regard is that it was made in the context of adjustments to the foreign market value
component of the antidumping duty calculation, essentially a matter of accounting,
which seemed to require no foreign policy choices.
21. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
22. 121 S.Ct. 2164 (2001).
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Christensen appears to limit Chevron deference significantly.
Justice Thomas, on behalf of a five-justice majority,23 opined as
follows:
In Chevron, we held that a court must give effect to an
agency's regulation containing a reasonable interpretation of
an ambiguous statute.
Here, however, we confront an interpretation contained in
an opinion letter, not one arrived at after, for example, a for-
mal adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking. Inter-
pretations such as those in opinion letters-like interpreta-
tions contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and en-
forcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law-do
not warrant Chevron-style deference. Instead, interpretations
contained in formats such as opinion letters are "entitled to
respect" under our decision in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,24 but
only to the extent that those interpretations have the "power
to persuade." As explained above, we find unpersuasive the
agency's interpretation of the statute at issue in this case.
Of course, the framework of deference set forth in Chevron
does apply to an agency interpretation contained in a regula-
tion.2 5
Christensen thus limits Chevron deference to statutory inter-
pretations that are tested by the rigors of the regulatory promul-
gation process or procedures similar to adjudication with attend-
ant safeguards. Otherwise, the Christensen opinion indicates
26
that "[i]nstead, interpretations contained in formats such as
23. In Christensen, Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment and most of the major-
ity opinion, but not in the crucial section quoted. Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer dissented. Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, however, appears to accept
the continuing validity of Skidmore deference, but perhaps only in narrower circum-
stances than the majority: "[T]o the extent that there may be circumstances in which
Chevron-type deference is inapplicable-e.g., where one has doubt that Congress actu-
ally intended to delegate interpretive authority to the agency (an 'ambiguity' that Chev-
ron does not presumptively leave to agency resolution)-] believe that Skidmore none-
theless retains legal vitality." 529 U.S. at 596-597 (Breyer, J., concurring). In Mead,
however, only Justice Scalia dissented.
24. 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
25. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 586-87 (internal citations omitted).
26. This view is subscribed to by the majority with the exception of Justice Scalia,
who characterizes Skidmore deference as follows: "Skidmore deference to authoritative
agency views is an anachronism, dating from an era in which we declined to give agency
interpretations (including interpretive regulations, as opposed to 'legislative rules') au-
thoritative effect." Id. at 589 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment). This characterization was repeated in Mead, 121 S.Ct. at 2177-2189 (Scalia, J.
dissenting).
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opinion letters are 'entitled to respect' under our decision in
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., but only to the extent that those interpre-
tations have the 'power to persuade."' 27
This theme was carried forward and clarified in United States
v. Mead, in which the Supreme Court, with only Justice Scalia
dissenting, found decisions as to classification of imported mer-
chandise for tariff purposes were also entitled to Skidmore, not
Chevron, deference. The Court found a system of informal
rulemaking in which forty-six different Customs District offices
could generate rulings did not indicate a Congressional delega-
tion of law making.28 The Court also considered the role of the
CIT in reviewing classification decisions as evidence of a Con-
gressional understanding at odds with the Chevron regime.29
Overall, the Court's opinion represents a totality of the circum-
stances approach in which no one factor is determinative as to
whether the Chevron mode of analysis applies.3 0 Mead empha-
sizes that the basis for Chevron deference is Congress' intent to
delegate "authority to the agency generally to make rules carry-
ing the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming
deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority."'"
Delegation is demonstrated "by an agency's power to engage in
adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some
other indication of a comparable congressional intent." 2
While in ITA and ITC proceedings there is a somewhat
more centralized decision-making process than that described in
Mead, there is also CIT review as in Mead. Further, it is unclear
whether the type of investigatory-adjudicatory proceedings uti-
lized by the ITA and the ITC in unfair trade matters have the
appropriate safeguards or are those "formal adjudications" re-
ferred to in Christensen and Mead as warranting Chevron defer-
ence. Trade proceedings generally are commenced by a domes-
tic petitioner seeking imposition of duties on a class of goods
from a particular country or countries to offset the alleged un-
fair trade practice, whereupon the relevant agencies embark
27. 529 U.S. at 587.
28. Mead, 121 S.Ct. at 2175-2176.
29. Id. at 2187.
30. Id. at 2175-2187.
31. Id. at 2171.
32. Id.
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upon an "investigation."3 Questionnaires are used and partici-
pants in the proceedings may attempt to shape the question-
naires.3 4 Information may be received in ex parte meetings.3 5
Parties may comment upon the submissions of other parties, but
they may be hampered by limited access to proprietary data.36
In initial investigations and in some periodic reviews, the ITA
performs on site verifications of foreign respondent question-
naire responses.3 7 It also accepts and considers comments upon
draft results of its investigations. No formal record is compiled
by either agency until court proceedings commence, and there
is no administrative law judge. Hearings before the ITA are in
the nature of oral argument on the briefs submitted,"s whereas
more formalized hearings take place before the ITC. 9
The "formal adjudication" and the "notice-and-comment
rulemaking"4 ° referred to in Christensen and Mead as warranting
Chevron deference share the following characteristics, which ap-
pear to have their origin in a concept of due process, as well as a
simple desire for informed decision-making: formal notice to the
affected party of proposed governmental action, an opportunity
for comment that must be considered, the creation of a formal
record, and an impartial adjudicator.41 Without clear Congres-
33. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.201, et seq. (2000).
34. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ANTIDUMPING MANUAL, Chapter 4: Questionnaires
(Jan. 22, 1998).
35. 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(a) (3) (1994).
36. See 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(c) (1994); 19 C.F.R. 351.308 (2000); DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE, ANTIDUMPING MANUAL, Chapter 3: Access to Information (Jan. 22, 1998).
37. See 19 C.F.R. § 351.307 (2000).
38. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ANTIDUMPING MANUAL, Chapter 14: Hearings and
Briefs (Jan. 22, 1998).
39. For ITC procedures, see generally INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION, AN-
TIDUMPING AND COUNTERVAILING DUTY HANDBOOK, Pub. 3257 (Nov. 1999).
40. Notice-and-comment rulemaking has its origin in the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1966). These procedures are designed to assure fairness and
mature consideration of rules of general application. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon, Co.,
394 U.S. 759, 764 (1969).
41. In other contexts, the U.S. Supreme Court has described the minimal require-
ments of due process: Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522 (1927) (reviewing historical
development, from the common law, of the principle "[t]hat officers acting in ajudicial
or quasi judicial capacity are disqualified by their interest in the controversy to be de-
cided."); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (hearing that is required prior to termi-
nation of welfare benefits must provide timely and adequate notice detailing reasons
for proposed action and an effective opportunity to defend by confronting adverse wit-
nesses and presenting arguments and evidence orally); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976) (finding predetermination evidentiary hearing not required in disability
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sional direction, agency interpretations that are the result only
of the actions and views of lower level agency officials, without
formal adjudication or rulemaking, do not appear to qualify for
Chevron deference.42 Under Christensen and Mead, they may be
entitled only to Skidmore deference: respect to the extent they
have the power to persuade. 43 As the matter of deference in un-
fair trade proceedings appears unresolved in the wake of Chris-
tensen and Mead, for the purpose of this Essay we assume that not
every agency statutory interpretation decision reflected in such
matters is entitled to full Chevron deference.
III. THE CHARMING BETSY DOCTRINE
When faced with decisions of the ITC and the ITA address-
ing controversies arising from disputes about domestic interna-
tional trade law implementing legislation, however, Article III
court face an additional complexity. The Charming Betsy44 pro-
vides that "an act of [C]ongress ought never to be construed to
benefits proceedings and opining that due process is flexible and requires analysis of
governmental and private interests involved, as well as risk of erroneous deprivation of
private interest and probable value of alternate procedural safeguards). Mead adopts
this view, at least in part, as follows: "Congress contemplates administrative action with
the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative procedure tend-
ing to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronouncement of
such force. Cf Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 741 (1966) (APA
notice and comment 'designed to assure due deliberation'). Thus, the overwhelming
number of our cases applying Chevron deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-
comment rulemaking or formal adjudication." Mead, 121 S.Ct. at 2172-2173 (citations
omitted).
42. These unfair trade proceedings seem to require more procedural safeguards
than the opinion letter at issue in Christensen or the ruling at issue in Mead. The extent
to which an international relations gloss bears on the issue of deference is discussed in
the following section. Mead admits that there are some other exceptional undefined
circumstances in which an agency's interpretation of a statute is entitled to Chevron
deference. Mead, 121 S.Ct. at 2173.
A Statement of Administrative Action ("SAA") was approved by Congress in 19
U.S.C. § 3511(a) as the "authoritative expression by the United States concerning the
interpretation and application of the Uruguay Round Agreements and this Act in any
judicial proceeding in which a question arises concerning such interpretation or appli-
cation." 19 U.S.C. § 3512(d) (1994). This article concerns statutory interpretation not
covered by the SAA.
43. Christensen, 520 U.S. at 587. The question of deference to agency interpreta-
tion of statutes is quite apart from the deference required by statute in reviewing a
decision of the agency. The decision is reviewed for substantial evidence, 19 U.S.C.
§ 1516a(b) (1) (B) (i) (1994), and the methodologies chosen by the agencies are pre-
sumptively correct. Fujitsu Gen. Ltd. v. United States, 88 F.3d 1034 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
44. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
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violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction re-
mains. ''4 Although almost two hundred years have passed since
the decision and the position of the United States within the in-
ternational community has changed markedly, the Charming
Betsy doctrine, sometimes described as a canon of statutory con-
struction, continues to sail onward.4 6
The difficult issues arise when the courts are faced with di-
vining the meaning of domestic international trade statutes not
just with the guidance of domestic international trade law and
the agencies administering these laws, but also with the guidance
of the international agreements giving rise to those laws. In
1995, for example, in the Federal-Mogul case, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit cited the Charming Betsy as the
basis for accepting an agency interpretation in accordance with
"international law," in the face of an arguably clear statute to the
contrary.47 Federal-Mogul presents an unusual version of the issue
under discussion here. The Department of Commerce followed
what it viewed as a requirement of GATT that it determined had
not been addressed directly by the domestic implementing legis-
lation.4" At that time, the ITA interpretation of an unclear stat-
ute would have been entitled to Chevron deference. The United
States Court of International Trade, however, found a conflict
with the clear language of an extant earlier statute.4" The CIT's
decision was reversed by the Federal Circuit: "For the Court of
International Trade to read a GATT violation into the statute,
over Commerce's objection, may commingle powers best kept
separate."5 Federal-Mogul equates GATT with the customary in-
ternational law at issue in the Charming Betsy. We do not take
issue with that approach, as GATT, being less than a treaty from
the U.S. perspective, for purposes of this analysis, may be placed
in the same category. Further, Federal-Mogul did not address an
agency interpretation that conflicted with GATT. The additional
complication is that all parties do not understand GATT to mean
45. Id. at 118.
46. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethink-
ing the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEo. L.J. 479 (1997) (arguing that the
decision reflected the concerns about the position of the United States as a new and
relatively weak nation in the world community).
47. Federal-Mogul Corp. v. United States, 63 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
48. Id. at 1581.
49. Id. at 1577.
50. Id. at 1582.
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the same thing. In fact, the WTO recognizes that national inter-
pretations of WTO antidumping provisions that are reasonable
will not be held to violate the GATT Antidumping Agreement."'
In any case, for purposes of domestic law, it is clear that the
intent of Congress is the key, and international agreements such
as GATT do not "trump" domestic law. 52 In Erie R.R Co. v.
Tompkins,53 the U.S. Supreme Court established the principle
that "law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not
exist without some definite authority behind it."'54 After Erie, in
the words of Justice Jackson, "[f] ederal common law implements
the federal Constitution and statutes, and is conditioned by
them. ' 55 Whatever the view in other contexts about whether
Federal courts should continue to apply customary international
law as a type of Federal common law, if the WTO agreements are
equated to customary international law, as Federal-Mogul sug-
gests, the practice should be considered inapposite when ad-
dressing domestic international trade law.56 The notion that
there exists a body of international law to be adopted by the Fed-
eral courts in an area of the law-domestic international trade
law-in which Congress has legislated in great detail is likely in-
consistent with our current understanding of the role of the
51. § 17.6, Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Legal Instruments-Results of the Urn-
guay Round vol. 27, H.R. Doc. 103-316, at 1453 (1994). See Steven P. Croley &John H.
Jackson, WfO Dispute Procedures, Standard of Review, and Deference to National Governments,
90 AM. J. INT'L. L. 193, 209 (1996) (noting the parallel with Chevron and arguing that
the rationale underlying Chevron deference does not support WTO deference to na-
tional interpretations of GATT).
52. Suramerica, 966 F.2d at 668.
53. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
54. Id. at 79 (quoting Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
55. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 472 (1942) (Jackson,J, concur-
ring). See Bradley, supra note 46, at 513-517, 523-525, and commentators cited therein.
56. See RICHARD H. FALLON, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO HART, THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 63 (Hart and Wechsler's 2000 Supp.); Curtis
A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A
Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997) (contending that consider-
ing customary international law as federal common law is inconsistent with Erie). Cf
Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1835
(1998) (international law should be treated by Federal Courts as part of Federal com-
mon law, unless "ousted as law for the United States by contrary federal directives").
But see Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International Law: A Re-
sponse to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (1997) (arguing that
there are "major errors" in the Bradley and Goldsmith argument).
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courts in our constitutional system.57
If only the statute, the international agreement, and the
agency interpretation are at issue, it should not be terribly hard
to resolve the statutory interpretation problem. If the statute is
clear, it controls. And it controls even in the face of a contrary
agency interpretation. Even under Chevron and the Charming
Betsy, such an interpretation is not considered by the reviewing
518court.
If the statute is unclear, but the international agreement is
clear, it likely should aid the court's interpretation, but perhaps
not based upon the Charming Betsy principles, as they have been
understood. Rather, the statute is intended to implement the
agreement, and the relevant WTO agreement may be viewed as
secondary legislative history. In such a case, under the second
step of Chevron, a contrary agency position usually should not be
accorded deference. If in the particular case Congress explicitly
had left a gap in the statute for the agency to fill, an agency
interpretation contrary to clear WTO language probably should
be considered "manifestly contrary to the statute."5 9 If, on the
other hand, the legislative delegation to the agency is implicit,
an agency opinion that conflicts with a clear WTO directive
likely should be considered unreasonable.6' Reliance upon the
Charming Betsy principles is unnecessary.
If the statute is unclear and the international agreement is
unclear, the court ought to give an appropriate level of defer-
ence to an agency decision. After Christensen and Mead, the level
of deference would depend upon the nature of the agency inter-
pretation and the procedures that spawned it.6" Congress by
positive law has delegated responsibility to the agency, either an
executive branch agency-the ITA of the Commerce Depart-
ment-or an independent agency-the ITC. In either event, the
57. Cf Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Ca., 512 U.S. 298, 331 (1994) (in
resolving an international trade dispute between other nations and California, the
Court opined: "[W]e leave it to Congress-whose voice, in this area, is the Nation's-to
evaluate whether the national interest is best served by tax uniformity, or state auton-
omy.").
58. Under the first step of Chevron, the court determines whether that statutory
language is clear. If it is, no resort to agency interpretation is made.
59. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-844 ("Such legislative regulations are given controlling
weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute").
60. Id. at 844.
61. See supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text.
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responsibility for adhering to the relevant international law
should be with the agencies, which have both the Constitutional
authority delegated by Congress and, at least as to the ITA, an
aspect of the Constitutional authority of the Executive Branch in
foreign relations.12 If the Court is uncertain whether the agency
has given adequate consideration to matters of international law,
it should consider remand to the agency with appropriate direc-
tion. The court probably should avoid importing its interpreta-
tion of international law into its decision in derogation of defer-
ence to the agency.
Added to the interpretational stew now are the Appellate
Body and various dispute resolution panels of the WTO.6" They
interpret the international agreements, including, of course,
their ambiguities. Once again, if the domestic statute is clear,
the U.S. court must apply it as written, whatever the conse-
quences to international considerations and the views of interna-
tional organizations. It is the Executive Branch that must re-
spond to a WTO decision that concludes a U.S. statute unreason-
ably interprets and thus violates one of the WTO agreements.64
If the statute is unclear, however, the court is faced with the
problem of what weight should be given to an interpretation of a
WTO dispute resolution body. If an agency decision entitled to
full Chevron deference and the WTO decision are in accord,
then the "reasonableness" of the agency decision is given strong
support by the WTO interpretation, and a court should hesitate
to find such an agency decision "unreasonable." The Charming
Betsy doctrine, if applicable, also points in the same direction.
Even if the agency interpretation is entitled only to Skidmore def-
erence, the WTO decision adds to the "respect" that should be
given to the agency decision.
62. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Ex-
port Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) ("In this vast external realm, with its important,
complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to
speak or listen as a representative of the nation.").
63. NAFTA panel decisions have not played a large role in decision-making in the
U.S. courts. Perhaps the arbitral nature of the proceedings and the lack of precedential
effect has led to the minimal role in domestic jurisprudence.
64. See 19 U.S.C. § 3533(g) (1994) (Trade Representative to consult with Congress
and relevant executive agency before modification of law or practice to comply with
WTO decision); 19 U.S.C. § 3538(a) (1994) (Trade Representative consultation with
Congress before ITC acts to conform to W17O decision); 19 U.S.C. § 3538(b) (1994)
(specifying prerequisites for compulsion by Trade Representative of conformity with
WTO decision as to unfair trade practices).
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On the other hand, if an agency decision entitled to full
Chevron deference is in conflict with a WTO decision, the court
is faced with a difficult dilemma, a collision among the Charming
Betsy principles or their like, Chevron, and the implications of
Erie.6" The agency decision carries with it the statutory authority
delegated by Congress, either explicitly or implicitly, and, for the
ITA, the Constitutional authority and responsibility of the Exec-
utive Branch.66 If the agency decision is the consequence of
rulemaking or adjudication with attendant due process safe-
guards for the parties involved, thus carrying the force of law,
under Christensen and Mead it is entitled to full Chevron defer-
ence. If an intervening WTO decision has occurred that con-
flicts with the agency decision, the reviewing court probably
should consider remand of the case to the agency for considera-
tion of the WTO decision, which may moot the potential con-
flict. 6 7
If, however, the agency has already considered the WTO de-
cision and full Chevron deference is owed because the agency has
acted while according the parties the benefit of the regulatory-
promulgation process or adjudication with attendant due pro-
cess safeguards, then, perhaps, the schooner should sink. The
ITA, as part of the executive branch, has responsibilities, along
65. In Hyundai Elecs. Co., 53 F. Supp.2d at 1334, the CIT upheld a Commerce De-
partment regulation regarding the standard for revoking antidumping duty orders in
the face of a WTO Panel Report to the contrary, stating: "unless the conflict between an
international obligation and Commerce's interpretation of a statute is abundantly clear,
a court should take special care before it upsets Commerce's regulatory authority under
the Charming Betsy doctrine." Id. at 1345. Thus, the court viewed the dispute-resolution
body's view of the international agreement and the international agreement as sepa-
rate.
Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REv. 649, 679
(2000) supports the proposition that "these canons [including the Charming Betsy ca-
non] should not trump Chevron deference, at least where there is a 'controlling execu-
tive act."' He states thereafter that the Court of International Trade in several decisions
has concluded "that the Supreme Court has already held that the Charming Betsy canon
trumps Chevron deference," citing HyundaiElecs. Co., 53 F. Supp. 2d at 1344, and Foot-
wear Distribs. and Retailers of Am. v. United States, 852 F. Supp. 1078 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1994). Id. at 686-687. These decisions, however, do not support the conclusion
reached by Professor Bradley.
66. In Suramerica, 966 F.2d at 667, once Chevron deference was found owing to a
Commerce determination of an ambiguous statute, a conflicting GATT panel interpre-
tation did not prevail over the agency interpretation.
67. But cf Delverde, SrL v. United States, 202 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (court
noted its interpretation of new statute was in accord with intervening WTO decision
rejecting agency interpretation).
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with the Trade Representative, for weighing the significance of
the WTO decision. 68 The ITC, even though it is an independent
agency, must at some point consider the wisdom or lack thereof
of the WTO decision, if only to respond to the Trade Represen-
tative. The Court, however, has limited means of assessing the
fairness of the WTO dispute resolution mechanism.6 9 For the
court to give overriding weight to the WTO decision, based
upon the Charming Betsy doctrine, may be likened to the court
operating under the pre-Erie, now rejected, notions of Swift v.
Tyson.70 The court could be said to be seeking some form of
"transcendental body of law,"''7 not promulgated by the sover-
eign speaking through its legislative and executive branches.72
If the agency's decision is not reduced to a regulation, how-
ever, it may not be law and therefore, unless arrived at through
adjudication with appropriate safeguards, may be entitled only
to Skidmore deference.73 If only Skidmore deference is owed the
court should not reject the interpretations of the WTO bodies,
but should consider them as it weighs the agency's position.
While the agency's interpretation is entitled to "respect," Chris-
tensen, Mead and the Charming Betsy, or its legislative history co-
68. The Executive Branch is faced with addressing the ramifications of its actions
upon its stance in future trade negotiations and the potential domestic consequences.
See, e.g., Arun Venkataraman, Note, Binational Panels and Multilateral Negotiations: A Two-
Track Approach to Limiting Contingent Protection, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 533 (1999)
(examining impact of binational panel system and WTO dispute resolution upon future
trade negotiations with the United States).
69. See id. at 565-575 (discussing the NAFTA procedures). See also William R.
Sprance, The World Trade Organization and United States' Sovereignty: The Political and Proce-
dural Realities of the System, 13 Am. U. INT'L L. REV., 1225, 1246-1250 (1998) (discussing
the WTO procedures). Generally, WTO proceedings are not as open as the United
States wishes. See id. See also 19 U.S.C. § 3536 (1994) (requiring Trade Representative
to seek transparency in WTO proceedings, including dispute settlement). U.S. partici-
pants also have sought greater openness in NAFTA panel proceedings. See, e.g., Inter-
national Trade, Vol. 17, No. 12, at 489 (BNA Mar. 23, 2000).
70. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
71. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. at 533 (Holmes, J. dissenting).
72. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 471 (2000) (opining
that Erie forbids federal courts from relying on vague notions of a "general" common
law unconnected to the commands of any specific sovereign).
73. "Chevron did nothing to eliminate Skidmore's holding that an agency's interpre-
tation may merit some deference whatever its form, given the 'specialized experience
and broader investigations and information' available to the agency ... and given the
value of uniformity in its administrative and judicial understandings of what a national
law requires." Mead, 121 S.Ct. at 2175 (internal citations omitted).
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rollary, indicate that the court should consider competing ap-
proaches.
CONCLUSION
The subtleties and nuances of domestic international trade
law reflect both domestic concerns and the complexities of inter-
national trade negotiations and relationships.7 ' A careful analy-
sis of the development of a particular statutory interpretation is
therefore essential. The sometimes conflicting directions given
by the Charming Betsy, Chevron, Christensen, Mead, and Erie must
be considered in each case and applied based upon the nature
of the process that resulted in the statutory interpretation at is-
sue. The Charming Betsy does not suffice to support an interpre-
tation in accordance with a WTO determination. Further, Chev-
ron may not always provide the rationale when such a determina-
tion is rejected.
74. The perceived consequences of globalization and free trade have ignited politi-
cal controversy on a transnational scale. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, A Grand Trade Bar-
gain, 80 FOR. AFF. 65 (2001) (describing increasing resistance among developing na-
tions to U.S. trade policy); International Trade, Vol. 16, No. 48, at 1990 (BNAJan. 29,
1999) (WTO Seattle ministerial meeting fails in midst of violent street demonstrations).
This pattern continued in Genoa, Italy in July 2001.
